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THE INTEGRATION OF ZERO-BASE BUDGETING WITH 
MANAGEMENT-BY-OBJECTIVES: AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY* 
JOHN J. WILLIAMS and JAMES D. NEWTON 
Facul[y of Business, University of Alberta 
and 
ERIC A. MORGAN 
Woods Gordon 
Abstract 
Popular arguments in the management literature advocate the implementation congruity and complemen- 
tarity of zero-base budgeting (ZBB) with an established management-by-objectives (MBO) system. The 
present study examined management perceptions on 28 ZBB implementation variables for MB0 users and 
non-MB0 users which were gathered from 153 managers at two hierarchical levels within a single private 
sector organization. Results from both univariate and multivariate tests indicate that ZBB implementation 
was not facilitated by the existence of an MB0 system for either lower level management or for upper level 
management. The evidence obtained here strongly suggests that the purported conventional rationale 
underlying ZBB coupling with an extant MB0 system is seriously defective; ZBB design implementation 
issues need to be thoroughly re-assessed, with the emphasis on matching compatible systemic properties 
between information sub-systems 
Zero-base Budgeting (ZBB) has been heralded 
as one of the most promising techniques for con- 
trolling discretionary cost activity in hostile 
environments.’ Practical implementation, how- 
ever, has often been marred by controversy. Var- 
ious explanations are offered for the difficulty in 
implementation, including lack of organizational 
support (Van Gunsteren, 1976); lack of approp- 
riate training mechanisms (Schick, 1978; Dean 
8; Cowen. 1979; Cowen & Dean, 1979); 
administrative complexities (Anthony, 1977; 
Gurvitz, 1977; Draper & Pitsvada, 1978); incom- 
patible coupling with cognitive abilities (Wil- 
davsky, 1975); and symbolic political strategies 
(Dirsmith & Jablonsky, 1979a; Dirsmith et al., 
1980) in tandem with ritualistic budgeting pro- 
cesses (Jonsson, 1982).2 These cited difficulties 
converge to suggest that adoption of ZBB 
creates additional information processing 
requirements for the organization. 
* We are extremely grateful for the suggestions and comments from R. Greenwood, C. R. Hinings, J. D. Jobson. P. Tiessen. J. 
H Waterhouse, members of the Accounting Workshop at The University of Alberta. and two anonymous (AOS) reviewers. 
’ The use of the term “hostile“ environments in conjunction with ZBB is generally intended to signify the need to reduce or 
eliminate slack resources in the organization Ofcourse, ZBB may be deployed for resource re-allocation purposes which sub- 
sequently leads to increased discretionary spending. notwithstanding environmental uncertainty. 
.’ Ginzberg ( 1980) provides a summar) of the implementarion factor research and implementation process research litera- 
ture related fo the implementation of accounting and information systems. Also. Galbraith ( 1973) provides an excellent “ra- 
tional” view of strategies intended to match organizations’ information processing needs and their information processing 
requirements For a “political” view of this process. see Markus & Pfeffer ( 1983) and Pfeffer ( 1978). 
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One possible solution to this information 
imbalance problem in implementing ZBB is two- 
sided: generate strategies, on the one hand, to 
reduce the information requirements of ZBB; 
alternatively, generate strategies to increase the 
organizational capacity for ZBB integration.’ Ele- 
ments of the former include, for example, an 
expanded temporal frame for ZBB implementa- 
tion, increased budgeting personnel, and 
budgetary incentives, while the latter is effected 
by formalization procedures such as standard 
operating decisions, common communication 
formats and language, and management training 
programs. Recently, a strategy has been promul- 
gated which embraces both aspects of this 
solution. It focuses on the supposedly com- 
plementary nature of ZBB and Management-by- 
Objectives (MBO) (Dady, 1979; Keys St Bell, 
1979; Bhada & Minmier, 1980; Mighore, 1980). 
Stated simply, the existence of a solidly 
entrenched, mature MB0 system is viewed as an 
ideal precondition for implementation of ZBB. 
Smooth co-alignment of ZBB with MB0 is vie- 
wed as self-evident. 
opportunity to assess the integration of ZBB 
with MBO, as the organization had previously 
adopted the latter system on a voluntary basis. 
such that, at the time of ZBB implementation 
managers were almost evenly divided between 
MB0 users and non-users. The focus on a private 
sector organization, moreover. encouraged via- 
ble design metastrategies (Hedberg et al.. 
1976) such as the coupling of a management 
system (MBO) with a specialized and complex 
budgeting system (ZBB), to dominate over 
issues of political rationality (Wildavsky, 19’5; 
Dirsmith &Jablonsky, 1979b) which permeate 
the ZBB environment of public and not-for-pro- 
fit organizations. 
The strategy has an obvious appeal to budget- 
ing system designers and managers: both ZBB 
and MB0 processes reflect a planning and con- 
trol orientation; both transcend the organization 
hierarchy; both require goal specification and 
clarity; means-ends linkages are deemed to be 
mutually unambiguous; and rational calculation 
is the preferred mode of both processes 
(Drucker, 1954; De Woolfson, 1975; Jun, 1976; 
Phyrr, 1973; Haider, 1977; Patillo, 1977; Knight, 
1979; Dirsmith et al., 1980). The complemen- 
tary matching arises from the nature of the 
resource allocation process; MB0 stresses 
desired outputs while ZBB emphasizes required 
inputs. There is, however, no rigorous empirical 
evidence on which to assess whether ZBB can be 
implemented more readily in systems which 
employ MBO. 
At least three reasons for pursuing an inquiry 
into ZBB implementation within an existing 
MB0 framework are apparent. First, and from a 
more general perspective, recent articles on 
budgeting system design have discussed the 
need for designers’ anticipation of system 
implementation consequences (Hopwood, 
1978; Boland, 1979); knowledge pertaining to 
predesign criteria for effective systems 
implementation and integration (Ansari, 1977); 
and the need to anticipate the incompatible 
coupling of cybernetic and/or non-cybernetic 
control models (Landau & Stout, 1979; 
Hofstede, 198 1). Second, virtually all of the sur- 
veys and case studies on ZBB implementation 
have lacked a reasonable experimental and/or 
control group for testing purposes or have been 
devoid of any substantive hypotheses. Finally, 
and somewhat ironically, a substantial portion of 
the controversial literature on ZBB has ema- 
nated from public sector agencies where the 
emergence of MB0 pre-dated that of ZBB 
(Dirsmith & Jablonsky, 1979a; Haider, 1977; 
Rose, 1977; Drucker, 1976) yet the strategy 
under inquiry presupposes that the same sequ- 
ence of systems implementation is advantageous 
in a private sector setting. 
The present study was triggered when one of The remainder of the paper is organized into 
the largest natural resource companies in seven main sections. The first describes a 
Canada implemented ZBB as part of its opera- framework which results in a set of hypotheses. 
tional planning process. The setting provided an The methodology section then presents and dis- 
’ For examples and further discussion. see Gordon et al., 1984 
cusses the sample, the ZBB variables of primary 
interest in the present study, and the research 
design. Next, the results of the study are pre- 
sented, followed by discussion and implications 
of the results. The final sections contain a state- 
ment of study limitations and brief concluding 
comments. 
FRAMEWORK FOR HYPOTHESES 
The issue of concern in the present paper is 
the attitudinal and behavioral perceptions sur- 
rounding implementation of ZBB where there is 
an extant, well-developed MB0 system as 
opposed to implementation in the absence of 
such a system. Arguments from the professional 
literature which suggest that MB0 would facili- 
tate the implementation of a ZBB system are 
couched in three factors: (1) the goal-setting 
process; (2) the technological and methodologi- 
cal match between each process; and ( 3) a learn- 
ing dimension reflective of the first two factors, 
considered either separately or jointly. it should 
be noted in the present context that this set of 
factors deals exclusively with the process of 
budget preparation and planning; this set is in 
the ex ante control mode, and hence, does not 
include the ex post evaluative mode as part of 
the implementation process of ZBB. This is con- 
sistent with Hopwood ( 1976) Amey (1979a; 
1979b) and Flamholtz ( 1983) who view 
budgets for planning and for control as logically 
separate systems. Thus, the analysis of 
implementation strategies should not logically 
co-mingle the two modes of control. 
Apart from the above perspective, the reader 
should remember that the present inquiry is 
exploratory, and consequently, it is not guided 
by a well-developed theory. Rather, the hypoth- 
eses listed below are derived from the profes- 
sional management literature which follows the 
doctrine that the existence of any rational sys- 
tem (e.g. MBO) facilitates the coupling or 
implementation of a new rational system (e.g. 
ZBB). However, it is possible to marshal1 argu- 
ments which challenge this doctrine in the pre- 
sent context, and these are presented following 
the derivation of the research hypotheses. 
Goal-setting 
MB0 systems stress goal-setting and are 
results-oriented. Empirical studies note that 
MB0 leads to increased clarity in goal structures 
(Shetty & Carlisle, 1974; Tosi & Carroll, 1973 ), 
increased goal specificity (Raia, 1965) and 
increased goal awareness (Raia, 1965; Shetty & 
Carlisle, 1974). The goal-setting process is com- 
plex, and intervening or moderating variables 
such as quality of participation, defensive com- 
munication, leadership styles, motivation, and 
organizational structures “hold the power to 
make or break an MB0 application” (McConkie, 
1979, p.468). Presumably though, a mature, 
stabilized MB0 system has harnessed the posi- 
tive effects of appropriate moderating variables. 
Moreover, the theoretical framework of ZBB 
mirrors the same set of goal-setting factors as 
MBO. Therefore, the co-alignment of ZBB with 
MB0 entails duplication and overlap of the goal- 
setting process. 
The argument from the professional literature 
is that previous MB0 users should have in place 
a firm understanding of their roles and objec- 
tives. Moreover, this understanding should be 
easily transferred and integrated into the ZBB 
framework. The process of readdressing the sub- 
stantive aspects of the goal-setting process in 
conjunction with ZBB implementation would, 
therefore, be of less benefit to previous MB0 
users than to non-MB0 users. It is further argued 
that there is a greater need and, as such, a greater 
contribution to non-MB0 users in terms of 
improving communications, understanding, and 
agreement on goals and objectives between 
superiors and subordinates than would occur for 
MB0 users. Stated as a research hypothesis: 
H,: The goal-setting process associated with ZBB 
implementation yields a lower level of perceived benefit 
for previous MB0 users than for non-MB0 users. 
Resource allocation process4 
For MBO, the resource allocation process is 
’ The use of the phrase “resource allocation process” is used in place of the more familiar, but synonomous phrase. “planning 
and budgeting process ” 
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interactive, incremental and, some would argue, 
often non-financial (unless MB0 is a component 
part of operational planning). It is interactive in 
that a process of mutual goal-setting cascades 
down the organization hierarchy to the lowest 
contributing sub-unit and manager. Standards, in 
the form of mutually expected end-results, are 
an integral part of this process (Carroll & Tosi, 
1973; Drucker, 1976; McKonkie, 1979). The 
process is, simultaneously, implicitly incremen- 
tal; there is no overt accompaniment of desig- 
nated funding to match the desired output goals 
of the manager, sub-unit, or organization. There 
is, however, an implicit understanding that con- 
tinuity of programs will prevail, supplemented 
where necessary by a proportionate increase 
relative to the previous financial base. ZBB, in 
contrast, has interactive processes which origi- 
nate at the lowest management level, with a 
focus on inputs, and terminate at the upper level 
of the management hierarchy in a non-incre- 
mental manner, with no necessary guarantee of 
program continuity (Phyrr, 1970, 1973; Cheek, 
1977; Knight, 1979; Williams, 198 1). On the sur- 
face, MB0 is a highly rational resource allocation 
process, which can be characterized by the fol- 
lowing sequence: objectives + funding + 
strategies’; whereas, the sequence for ZBB is: 
strategies + objectives + funding. 
Arguments for the complementarity of ZBB 
and MB0 directly or indirectly focus on the 
above sequencing mismatch (Keys & Bell, 1979; 
Knight, 1979; Bhada & Minmier, 1980). Accord- 
ing to Bhada & Minmier (1980, p.45) the MB0 
process does not “. provide for methods of 
achieving results. It is precisely this limitation 
that ZBB attempts to eliminate, for it formalizes 
an expression of ‘how’ ends are to be achieved”. 
The subtle issue though, apart from the recogni- 
tion of the complementary nature of ZBB 
relative to an MB0 system, is the professional lit- 
erature’s view that ZBB implementation would 
be facilitated by the existence of an established 
MB0 system. For example, Bhada & Minmier 
(1980, p.45) note that “. . the MB0 process 
should help to articulate sectional strategies 
at each organizational level” (emphasis added). 
Moreover, Keys & Bell ( 1979, p.31) argue that 
ZBB and MB0 “are not only compatible. ..” but 
that an established MB0 system “. helps mana- 
gers understand the complexities involved in 
relating goals to budgets”. Migliore ( 1980, p. 14) 
asserts that “ZBB . would adapt well to MBO” 
again because both are rational processes and 
MB0 users have been indoctrinated into the 
strategy formulation process by virtue of their 
background. The implication of these arguments 
is that MB0 users would perceive more benefits 
than non-MB0 users, not because of ZBB per se, 
but rather because ZBB constitutes a natural 
extension and enhancement of the resource 
allocation tasks with which MB0 users are famil- 
iar and already performing. Thus, the following 
research hypothesis ensues: 
H,: The resource allocation process associated with ZBB 
implementation yields a higher level of perceived benefit 
for previous MB0 users than for non-MB0 users. 
Learning 
It is generally recognized that the introduc- 
tion and implementation of any new informa- 
tion system, such as ZBB, is subject to a learning 
curve phenomenon. There is virtually no disag- 
reement in the ZBB literature that any 
implementation of ZBB would contravene this 
phenomenon. However, there is an implicit con- 
viction in the professional literature proposal to 
couple ZBB specifically with a mature MB0 sys- 
tem that the effort required to learn and imple- 
ment ZBB would be facilitated on a relative basis 
by previous exposure to the MB0 system. 
Presumably, the MB0 system would foster an 
individual’s predisposition towards more plan- 
ning (Ivancevich, 1969; Ivancevich et al., 1970); 
acclimatize an individual to a structured plan- 
ning process; invoke a clearer understanding of 
roles and objectives (Raia, 1965; White, 1974); 
enhance superior-subordinate communication 
capabilities (Raia, 1965; Rossano, 1965); and 
favorably facilitate an awareness of resource 
’ The use of the word strategies in the present context is intended to mean the specific delineation of “ways” to achieve short- 
run objectives. 
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allocation (Tosi 8; Carroll, 1968). Clearly, the 
efficient extension of these attributes to a ZBB 
system is quite tenable according to the coupl- 
ing proposal. In the absence of MBO, even where 
there is a traditional budgeting system in place 
(as in the present instance), the implication is 
that the time required to learn ZBB would be 
greater. Managers would be compelled to adapt 
to structured planning in order to satisfy the 
constraints of ZBB. They would have to initiate 
the goal-setting process, including the identifca- 
tion, expression, agreement and documentation 
of their roles, responsibility, and objectives, 
without benefit of the MB0 experience. Con- 
comitantly, even though MB0 is an incremental 
process, the absence of MB0 would not particu- 
larly favor the non-incremental resource alloca- 
tion process imposed on managers by the ZBB 
model in terms of learning effort. Thus, formu- 
lated as a research hypothesis: 
H,: The learning effort (i.e. time) associated with ZBB 
implementation is lower for previous MB0 users than for 
non-MB0 users. 
Contrary to the above views, however, it is 
plausible that ZBB’s emphasis on goals will be 
seen by MB0 users as usefulprecisely because it 
is seen as building upon the MB0 goal struc- 
tures. MB0 users have gone through the trauma 
of erecting goals, so they will see ZBB as building 
upon them, thus reinforcing and justifying the 
effort previously invested. Non-MB0 users, on 
the other hand, will experience ZBB as a trauma 
of erecting goals without having done so with 
MBO. These people will see ZBB in its early 
stages as a disturbing influence. Also, given the 
voluntary nature of the MB0 system, any ques- 
tions of the utility of goal-setting (even though 
directed at ZBB) will be interpreted, wittingly or 
not, as an evaluation of goal-settingper se. 
Although MB0 users may very well like the 
goal setting part of ZBB because it utilizes (in- 
deed, is hardly different from) the MB0 product 
(i.e. the goals), the situation may not be similar 
for the resource allocation process. The 
hypothesis here has to do with whether MB0 
users will like, and therefore easily adapt to, a 
different resource allocation process even 
though it may be complementary. Here the 
question is one of possible cognitive overload. 
Would MB0 users regard ZBB as overly disrup- 
tive as compared to a system which they have 
recently managed to adopt and understand? 
Moreover, this type of disruption suggests that 
the learning research hypothesis is not reasona- 
ble because ZBB coupled with MB0 adds to 
complexity and the risk of cognitive overload. 
These counter-arguments to the professional lit- 
erature notwithstanding, the research strategy 
followed in the present paper is to test the 
research hypotheses as stated. 
METHODOLOGY 
Organization setting and sample 
The organization in this study is a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of a very large multi-national 
conglomerate which has a long history in the 
energy field. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
was responsible for operations dealing with oil 
and gas exploration, petroleum and mineral pro- 
duction, and heavy oil extraction projects 
located ,in Canada. The o.perations comprised a 
total work force of about ten thousand 
employees. The operating budget volume was 
over one billion dollars at the time of ZBB 
implementation. 
The organization involved was committed to a 
rigorous MB0 program. The commitment was 
evidenced by a formal statement of policy in the 
organization manual distributed to employees. 
The rigor was evidenced by the existence of 
internal MB0 training programs, sophisticated 
communication forms, dated scheduling for 
identifying and planning objectives, and a formal 
exception routine for monitoring feedback and 
controlling achievements. The program closely 
paralleled McConkie’s ( 1979a, p.37) definition: 
MB0 can properly be defined as: A managerial process 
whereby organizational purposes are diagnosed and met 
by joining superior and subordinates in the pursuit of 
mutually agreed upon goals and objectives which are 
specific, measurable, time bounded, and joined to an 
action plan; progress and goal attainment are measured 
and monitored in appraisal sessions which centre on 
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mutually determined objective standards of perfor- 
mance.‘ 
The MB0 system had been adopted some six 
years earlier on a voluntary basis. The company’s 
initial motivation for establishing an MB0 sys- 
tem was to bridge communication channels bet- 
ween expanding quasi-autonomous production 
and exploration units and a traditional incre- 
mental budgeting system at the operating level. 
Managers at lower levels (i.e. levels four and 
five) had been encouraged, but not pressured, to 
adopt MBO.’ At the time of adoption of ZBB, 
which was mandated for all managers through- 
out the entire organization, approximately one- 
half of lower level managers in the organization 
were using MB0 and one-half were not. Nearly 
60% of the MB0 users had participated in the 
MB0 system since its inception and approxi- 
mately 85% had participated for three years or 
longer. Of the non-MB0 users, less than 10% had 
participated in the MB0 system at one time or 
another, and none for longer than one financial 
operating cycle (i.e. one year). After six years of 
use, the retention of MB0 was definitely not in 
question because it was perceived that, for those 
who used it, the process was yielding positive 
results. 
The MB0 system spanned the entire lateral 
dimension of the organizational structure, 
which can be classified into six departments for 
the present discussion. Four out of the six 
departments were major operating segments of 
the organization. The fifth department was 
responsible for research and technological 
development, while the sixth department was 
comprised of all the remaining service support 
functions, including finance, accounting, human 
resources, external affairs, general services, law, 
tax, and others. However, the voluntary nature 
of the MB0 system and its corresponding mem- 
bership were most clearly distinguished in terms 
of the organization’s vertical hierarchy. The CEO 
at level one, together with executives at levels 
two and three (i.e. upper management) were 
necessarily involved with both MB0 and non- 
MB0 users on a continuing basis because of their 
commensurate authority and responsibility. 
Thus, the use of MB0 was not optional for these 
managers, but the option did exist for line mana- 
gers at levels four and five (i.e. lower manage- 
ment). Users and non-users of MB0 were more 
or less uniformly dispersed across all six depart- 
ments. 
A softening of the international oil market in 
1981, combined with the emergence of a Cana- 
dian National Energy Program and perceived 
unfavorable provincial pricing agreements, 
triggered top management’s attention to operat- 
ing costs in an effort to remain profitable. ZBB 
was seen as a necessary system for the entire 
organization under these circumstances, and 
was mandated for all managers at all levels. ZBB 
was pilot-tested in the same year and a decision 
for full-scale implementation ensued the next 
year. 
Management responses relating to the three 
research hypotheses were elicited by two ditTe- 
rent questionnaires: one was distributed to deci- 
sion unit managers (according to the ZBB ter- 
minology) classified as upper management, 
while the other questionnaire was distributed to 
decision unit managers classified as lower man- 
agement. The justification for this research 
design requires further explanation. On the one 
hand, the detailed theoretical treatment of the 
ZBB methodology (Phyrr, 1973; Cheek, 1977; 
Knight, 1979) explicitly recognizes that the 
decision making complexity and the related ZBB 
process tasks are logically difjFerent for upper 
’ Note that the Bhada and Minmier ( 1980) quotation cited earlier and the McConkie ( 1979) quotation disagree as to whether 
MB0 provides for means of achieving results. We see this as a semantic difference. since MB0 does include an action plan, 
but not necessarily in specific detail. 
_ The voluntary nature of the MB0 program was a troublesome issue to the present researchers and an anonymous reviewer 
in terms of its legitimacy and potential power implications. Top management steadfastly defended it’s position that these fac- 
tors were not an issue. They pointed to the organization’s incentive schemes, rhe performance-reward mechanisms in the var- 
ious departments throughout all levels of the hierarchy, and especially to the unbiased promotion record across both MB0 
users and non-MB0 users over the last six years. 
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level decision unit managers than for lower level 
decision unit managers. Among the more obvi- 
ous differences are the cross-impact analysis 
function and the de facto funding decision 
required of top management. These differences 
were confirmed in the organization under study, 
particularly with respect to the funding deci- 
sions, which were determined collectively by 
upper management. On the other hand, the argu- 
ments put forth in the professional literature on 
the compatibility of ZBB and MB0 do not 
address these differences in the context of ZBB 
implementation other than in the vaguest of 
terms. Rather, the assumption is that the degree 
of ZBB compatibility with MB0 at different 
hierarchical levels is uniform, and therefore is 
not an issue. Thus, the utilization of two different 
questionnaires is an attempt to assess any differ- 
ences in this respect. 
Accordingly, the first questionnaire was 
administered to decision unit managers at the 
fourth and frfh levels (lower management) of 
the organization hierarchy prior to the final 
funding decision made by upper management. 
The reason for this timing was to avoid potential 
distortions of responses in the lower manage- 
ment groups emanating from the ultimate level 
of funding obtained. Incomplete identification 
of user status, no responses, and exclusion of 
pilot-tested respondees, produced a sample of 
121 usable questionnaires from a total of 15 1 
questionnaires. The second questionnaire was 
administered to decision unit managers at the 
upper management level immediately after the 
final funding decision but before any monitoring 
of ex post operating strategies. Since one of the 
primary tasks of upper management is to make 
the funding decision, and since the study seeks 
to measure perceptions after completion of the 
ZBB process, this timing was necessary for top 
management, in contrast to the necessity to sur- 
vey lower management prior to the funding 
decision. The same attrition factors as for the 
first questionnaire produced 32 valid responses 
from a total of 39. 
Measurement and identification of variables 
The questionnaires administered to lower 
management (i.e. levels four and five in the 
organization hierarchy) asked managers to indi- 
cate their current status in terms of MB0 use or 
non-MB0 use (independent variable). In addi- 
tion, 28 questions were presented which gener- 
ated the dependent variables listed in Exhibit 1. 
The first four questions dealt with major aspects 
of the goal setting process associated with ZBB 
implementation: specifically, the clarification of 
responsibility (variable X, ); the improvement in 
understanding end results expected by top man- 
agement (variable X,); the communication and 
coordination qualities between superiors and 
subordinates concerning responsibilities and 
expected end results (variable X,); and the value 
of the results obtained from the goal setting pro- 
cess in relation to the amount of work effort 
required. A Likert five point scale8 was utilized to 
measure managerial perceptions on variables 
x,-x*. 
Questions 5-24 attempted to capture the 
essence of the resource allocation tasks 
associated with ZBB budget preparation from 
two different perspectives: a micro perspective 
intended to focus on the specific steps or func- 
tions of cross impact analysis, decision package 
formulation, and ranking, all ofwhich are charac- 
teristic of ZBB; and a systemic (macro) perspec- 
tive of these separate functions. It is well recog 
nized in the accounting system and organization 
literatures that properties of a system’s “parts” 
do not sum to properties of the “whole” system. 
The pilot test in the present organization con- 
firmed this difference with respect to ZBB, and 
thus revealed the need to isolate the two 
perspectives. Hence, variables Xs-X,,, variables 
X,,-X,,, and variables X,,-X,, were utilized to 
measure management perceptions on the micro 
aspects of cross-impact anaiysis, decision pack- 
age formulation, and ranking, respectively, using 
the identical scale as for the goal-setting vari- 
ables. Turning to the systemic perspective, ques- 
tions 22-24 asked the managers to rate the ZBB 
’ The responses ranged from: 1 - to a very little extent; 2 - to a little extent; 3 - to some extent; 4 - to a great extent; 
and 5 - to a very great extent. 
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EXHIBIT 1. The dependent variables used in statistical tests relating to management perceptions of ZBB. 
Goal setting process (Hypothesis 1) 
‘X, Clarifying responsibility of decision unit. 
‘X2 Understanding end-results expected from decision unit. 
.X, FacilitatingsuperiorMtbordinate communication and agreement on responsibilities and expected end-results from 
decision unit. 
‘X, Effectiveness of goal setting process. 
Cross impact analysis (Hypothesis 2) 
X5 Involvement in cross impact analysis process. 
X, Facilitating agreement on interfacing decision unit support within department. 
X7 Facilitating agreement on interfacing decision unit support with other departments. 
X” Development of cost awareness among users of service. 
X9 Identifying redundant, duplicated, or unnecessary services. 
*X,, Effectivenessofcross impact analysis. 
Decision package formulation (Hypothesis 2) 
X1, Developing understandingofactivities required to achieve decision unit objectives. 
‘X,L Developing understanding of costs and benefits of performing incremental work. 
‘X, 5 Developing understanding of relative priority of incremental work. 
XI, Appropriate allocation of personnel 
‘X,5 Communication capability for recommending courses ofaction. 
‘X,, Effectiveness of decision package process, 
Ranking (Hypothesis 2) 
X1, Production ofpriorized list of expenditure opportunities. 
X,, Ensuring recognition of most beneficial packages by senior management. 
X,, Understanding peer activities and related input. 
‘X,, Understanding implicationsof alternative funding levels. 
‘X,, Effectiveness of ranking process. 
Systems perspective of ZBB process (Hypothesis 2) 
‘X,a Preparing an effective departmental budget compared to previous methods. 
‘X,, Improving communications among lower, middle, and upper management. 
‘X,, Identifying and proposing improved ways ofachieving decision unit objectives. 
Learning (Hypothesis 3) 
X25 Hours spent on planning and budgeting expenditures. 
X,, Hours spent learning the process. 
X,, Hours spent on documentation as opposed to conception ofplans and budget. 
X,, Estimated hours to complete entire process next year. 
l Variables associated with upper management group. 
process in three areas on a five point scale rang- 
ing from poor to excellent. Variable X,, was 
utilized to measure the perceived effectiveness 
of ZBB compared to the traditional budgeting 
system which was used the previous year while 
variable Xz3 was concerned with managers’ per- 
ceptions on the ability of ZBB to improve com- 
munications between lower and upper manage- 
ment. Finally, variablex,, attempted to measure 
management perceptions concerning the over- 
all formulation of strategies necessary to achieve 
decision unit objectives. 
Questions 25-28 were designed to 
operationalize the learning dimension 
associated with ZBB implementation. Variable 
X,, measured the total time devoted to develop- 
ing the operating budget using the ZBB system. 
Since any new systems implementation involves 
some strictly mental activity (i.e. conceiving 
new strategies) as opposed to formally docu- 
menting these activities, variable Xz5 was 
decomposed into variable XZh and variable Xz7, 
respectively. The last variable, X,,, measured 
managers’ expectations on the amount of time 
ZBB would require in a subsequent budgeting 
cycle. This variable was deemed important in 
ascertaining if any consistency would ensue bet- 
ween variable X,, and variable Xz5, or whether 
there were important shifts in time expectations 
between MB0 users and non-MB0 users. The 
measurements of variablesx;, throughX,, were 
all denominated in hours. 
The questionnaire administered to upper 
management did not contain the identical set of 
questions administered to lower management, 
for reasons which were addressed earlier. How- 
ever, ten questions which were presented to 
upper management contained the same content 
and enabled the generation of a reduced set of 
variables denoted by the asterisks in Exhibit 1. 
Again, a Likert five point scale was utilized to 
measure the perceptions of upper management 
on this reduced set of variables. Although 
Exhibit 1 indicates sixteen variables associated 
with upper management, there are, in substance, 
only ten. VariablesX, andX, were differentiated 
for lower management but were grouped 
together as one question for upper management 
because the pilot study suggested that clarifica- 
tion of responsibilities and agreement on goals 
and objectives vis-a-vis the ZBB process could 
not be adequately differentiated among top man- 
agers. Also, variables X4, X,,, X,, and X,, , were 
collapsed into a single overall question on ZBB 
effectiveness in the questionnaire to upper man- 
agement because they were concerned with the 
global effectiveness of the ZBB system and not 
simply the effectiveness of any of its sub-parts.” 
Design and testprocedures 
The objective in generating measured percep- 
tions on the variable set for lower management 
is straightforward, given the hypotheses derived 
in the previous section. A test for the difference 
in perceived benefits between MB0 users 
(group 1) and non-MB0 users (group 2) for the 
variables in Exhibit 1 was carried out using both 
univariate and multivariate analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The differences between the two 
groups along these dimensions was then charac- 
terized using discriminant analysis. The advan- 
tage of the multivariate ANOVA and discrimin- 
ant analysis is that the interaction effects among 
the variables is controlled for in the analysis. 
The objective in generating measured percep- 
tions on the reduced set of variables pertaining 
to upper management (group 3) was to draw 
some inferences on ZBB implementation for this 
group relative to lower management. Since the 
upper management sample was comprised of 
previous MBO-users only, it was impossible to 
generate two groups in the same manner as for 
lower management. This necessitated a com- 
parative analysis of groups 1, 2 and 3 simultane- 
ously on the reduced set of variables (asterisks) 
in Exhibit 1. A test for differences in perceived 
benefits among these three groups was con- 
ducted by the use of both univariate and mul- 
tivariate ANOVA. A discriminant analysis was 
used to determine the relative importance of any 
of the dependent variables in the reduced set. 
RESULTS FOR LOWER MANAGEMENT 
Table 1 presents the results of 28 separate 
ANOVA tests together with a multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) using a discri- 
minant function technique. 
H, : Goal-setting 
While the corresponding t-values do not 
manifest any significant differences across the 
set of goal-oriented variables, the mean scores 
for three of the four goal-setting variables are 
higher for MB0 users; only in terms of improv- 
ing the understanding of end results expected 
from the decision unit (variable X,) did non- 
MB0 users score higher. Thus, the general direc- 
tion of the means is opposite to that 
’ Missing values on any variable were excluded from the data analysis. The degrees offreedom in subsequent statistical testing 
were adjusted accordingly. 
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TABLE 1. Results for lower management 
Dependent 
variables 
Means(x) 
Group 1 Group 2 
MB0 Non-MB0 
users users d.f. 
ANOVA 
t-value P< 
IMANOVA 
Standardized 
canonical 
coefficients 
Goal setting 
X, 
X, 
X+ 
X, 
3.32 3.17 118 0.88 0.43 0.3616 
3.17 3.31 118 -0.63 0.47 -0.4110 
3.44 3.41 118 0.01 0.99 0.3037 
2.92 2.83 116 0.35 0.66 0.5342 
Cross impact 
analysis 
X, 
X, 
XT 
X, 
X, 
X,,, 
2.69 2.44 114 1.18 0.2’ 0.0160 
2.71 2.51 104 1.11 0.34 0.4860 
2.5 1 2.58 103 -0.29 0.74 -0.2658 
2.79 2.81 105 0.0 1 0.93 0.1748 
2.22 2.46 104 -0.89 0.24 -0.4552 
2.68 2.64 106 0.30 0.86 0.3852 
Decision package 
formulation 
X1, 
X12 
XI, 
X,, 
X,, 
X1<> 
3.19 3.37 118 
3.12 3.27 118 
3.02 3.37 117 
2.98 3.27 117 
3.03 3.49 117 
2.83 3.22 118 
-0.95 
-1.72 
- 1.22 
-2.58 
- 2.07 
0.34 0.1130 
0.38 0.0423 
0.09 0.0496 
0.23 0.2701 
0.01 -0.4676 
0.04 -0.3124 
Ranking 
X1- 
X,” 
X,, 
X20 
X,, 
3.20 3.46 116 -1.65 0.10 0.1109 
2.88 3.31 117 -2.29 0.02 -0.2692 
3.20 3.49 117 -1.48 0.14 -0.0899 
3.18 3.31 117 -0.66 0.49 0.3259 
2.86 3.27 116 -2.45 0.02 -0.2292 
Systems perspective 
of ZBB resource 
allocation process 
XU 
X2, 
XZl 
3.14 3.51 116 -1.94 0.06 0.2782 
3.22 3.66 117 - 2.45 0.0 1 -0.3922 
2.74 3.53 117 -4.49 0.00 -0.6833 
Learning 
X2, 
X2, 
X2- 
X,, 
90.75 54.29 105 2.04 0.04 -0.7316 
56.68 31.75 105 2.32 0.02 0.3475 
34.07 22.54 105 I .93 0.06 0.6995 
60.05 36.4 I 103 1.99 0.05 0.3479 
Discriminant function: x1 = 51.97 
Group centroids 0.808 -0.808 (0.0039) 
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hypothesized, and the ANOVA results do not 
indicate that MB0 users obtained a less signific- 
ant contribution from ZBB than non-MB0 users. 
This does not imply, of course, that non-MB0 
users obtained a more significant contribution 
from ZBB. The implications of the latter are 
somewhat different, but will not be explored in 
this paper. 
H,: Resource allocation process 
The mean scores of all three macro variables 
pertaining to the ZBB resource allocation pro- 
cess (variables X,,, X13, X2*) are significantly 
lower for MB0 users relative to non-MB0 users. 
At the micro level, thirteen out of a total of 
seventeen variables yielded lower mean scores 
for MB0 users; six of the thirteen have corres- 
ponding t-values which are statistically signific- 
ant. The remaining four variables (X,, X,, X, and 
X,,), all pertaining to the cross impact analysis 
function, indicate higher mean scores for MB0 
users but none of which are significant. There- 
fore, the evidence does not support the proposi- 
tion in the professional literature that previous 
MB0 use is associated with more positive 
benefits relative to non-MB0 use due to the ZBB 
resource allocation process. Instead, the oppo- 
site relationship emerges for the ZBB resource 
allocation process, indicating that, perhaps, the 
sequencing mismatch discussed earlier is severe 
enough to cause previous MB0 use to actually 
hinder the ZBB resource allocation process. 
H,: Learning 
The mean scores for all four learning variables 
(X15-X,,) are significantly higher for MB0 users 
relative to non-MB0 users. The negative t-values 
in each case are diametrically opposite to the 
research hypothesis. Thus, experience with an 
MB0 system does not facilitate, in relative terms, 
the learning associated with ZBB implementa- 
tion; it may even hinder it. 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
showed that the hypothesis of equal means for 
the two groups over the 28 variables should be 
rejected since p < 0.004. Given that there is a 
significant difference between the two groups 
on the set of 28 variables, a discriminant analysis 
provides a description of how the two groups 
differ. The standardized discriminant coeffi- 
cients are arrayed in the last column of Table 1 
and further elaborate on the ANOVA findings. 
The canonical discriminant functions evaluated 
at the group means for MB0 users and non-MB0 
users are 0.808 and -0.808, respectively. The 
discriminant coeffkients indicate that, for MB0 
users, the learning and goal-setting variables 
tend to be high relative to the resource alloca- 
tion variables (particularly the macro variables) 
while the opposite relationship holds for non- 
MB0 users. This tendency contradicts the 
relationship between both groups suggested by 
the research hypotheses and is significant at the 
0.0039 level. 
Given such strong evidence contrary to the 
research hypotheses, the ANOVA tests were 
replicated on a departmental basis. The object- 
ive was to search for possible differences within 
the corporation which may have biased the 
global findings. These results (not shown) 
yielded only seven directional changes out of a 
possible 168 departmental mean scores. As 
expected, the exceptions (none significant) 
were confined to the goal-setting and cross 
impact analysis variables. Therefore, depanmen- 
tal characteristics did not appear to be a factor 
influencing the global results.‘0 
There is a possibility of a different bias in the 
above results contingent on the nature of the 
departmental tasks. Hofstede ( 1981) suggests 
that objectives, outputs, intervention effects, 
and the repetitiveness of activity, are factors 
” There may be concern among some readers that the ordinal data generated by the Liken-type scale contravenes the 
assumption of normality associated with the parametric ANOVA and MANOVA statistical tests employed in this study, and 
hence. necessitates the use of analogous non-parametric statistical tests. Accordingly, a non-parametric KruskaI-WaIlis one- 
way ANOVA test was conducted for each of the 28 variables listed in Table 1 and the levels of significance were found to be 
virtually identical to those produced by the parametric tests. Also, a multivariate KruskaI-Wallis (Katz & McSweeney, 1980) 
was performed on the set of 28 variables and, again, the level of significance was basically the same as that of the parametric 
MANOVA test. 
468 JOHN J. WILLIAMS, JAMES D. NEWTON and ERIC A. !vlORGA?. 
which differentiate the substantive nature of 
operating departments from administrative and 
service-oriented departments. ZBB is purport- 
edly more adaptive to the latter type of depart- 
ment. In order to gain additional insight into this 
matter and to provide additional evidence for 
the above results, departments were partitioned 
into two classifications: operating and service. 
Given the mean scores on each ZBB variable for 
both MB0 users (Group 1) and non-MB0 users 
(Group 2), the discriminant analysis technique 
yields a predictive measure of the group mem- 
bership for each respondent. Since each ques- 
tionnaire, in turn, was also coded by type of 
department, it was possible to ascertain if sig- 
nificant differences in group membership were 
being generated in the above dichotomous 
departmental classification. 
Table 2 presents the results of the discrimin- 
ant analysis utilizing the mean scores on the set 
of ZBB variables to predict departmental MB0 
user and non-MB0 user membership. The accu- 
racy is remarkably high and statistically signitic- 
ant for all departments considered collectively. 
and for operating and service departments con- 
sidered separately. The difference in accuracy 
between operating and service departments is 
less than 4%; thus, the nature of departmental 
tasks does not appear to confound the earlier 
results. 
RESULTS FOR TOTAL MANAGEMENT 
HIERARCHY 
The complexity and orientation of upper man- 
agement decision making in the ZBB implemen- 
tation process precluded any measurement of 
the learning variables for that group; thus, 
research hypothesis H, is irrelevant to the fol- 
lowing analysis. Also, the necessity for upper 
management to be familiar with MB0 prohibited 
TABLE 2. ZBB perceptions as indicators of group status* 
Predicted group 
Group 1 Group 2 
Actual 
group 
MB0 users 
(Group 1) 
Non-MB0 
users 
(Group 2) 
51 
12 
31 
20 
8 
4 
11 
7 
4 
27 
20 
’ Each cell is trichotomizcd to reflect the total sample. operating departments (upper right), and service departments (lower 
right). 
Percent correctly classified: All departments 
Operating departments 
Service departments 
80.99% @ < 0.00 1). 
79.45% @ < 0.001). 
83.33% @ < 0.001). 
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the construction of two independent status 
groups as was done for lower management. The 
testing strategy employed, therefore, attempted 
to discriminate upper management perceptions 
from the previous two lower management status 
groups on a reduced, but substantively identical, 
set of dependent ZBB variables pertaining to the 
goal-setting and resource allocation processes. 
Accordingly, the following null hypotheses were 
tested: 
H,: The goal-setting process associated with ZBB 
implementation yields no difference in the level of per- 
ceived benefits among MB0 users from lower manage- 
ment (group 1). non-MB0 users from lower manage- 
ment (group 2). and upper management (group 3). 
Hq: The resource allocation process associated with ZBB 
implementation yields no difference in the level of per- 
ceived benefits among MB0 users from lower manage- 
ment (group 1), non-MB0 users from lower manage- 
ment (group 2) and upper management (group 3). 
Table 3 presents the ANOVA and MANOVA 
results. Although the mean scores differ slightly 
among the three groups for the goal-setting vari- 
ables, the ANOVA differences are not statistically 
significant. This finding reinforces the earlier 
results which indicated that previous MB0 
exposure did not lessen ZBB’s perceived con- 
tribution to the goal-setting process (and, simi- 
larly, that non-exposure did not increase ZBB’s 
contribution). We are therefore unable to reject 
hypothesis H,. The situation is different, how- 
ever, for the resource allocation process vari- 
ables. All four’ ’ macro variables ( i.e.X,,,X,,,Xz4, 
and Yr) plus two of the four micro variables (i.e. 
X, 3 and X, 5) are significantly different among the 
three groups in the ANOVA analysis. There is 
thus strong evidence for rejection of hypothesis 
H,. The two significant discriminant functions (p 
< 0.000 and p < 0.03 1) confirm that the mean 
scores are not equal among the three groups 
over the entire set of ten variables. I2 The critical 
issue which emerges is how the means of the 
groups differ over this reduced set of variables 
when all variables are considered simultane- 
ously. 
A closer examination of the individual group 
means for the goal-setting variables indicates 
that perceptions of top management are very 
close to those of group 1 for variable X,, but are 
lower than the perceptions of either group 1 or 
group 2 for variable Y,. However, the accept- 
ance of research hypothesis H, in terms of top 
management would require that the group 3 
means be significantly lower than the group 2 
means for both the goal-setting variables X, and 
Y, and this is certainly not the case. Focusing 
attention on the resource allocation process var- 
iables reveals a split in the tendency for top man- 
agement perceptions to be more or less similar 
to the perceptions of groups 1 and 2. Specifi- 
cally, the means for groups 2 and 3 tend to be 
similar (and higher) on variables X,,, X,,, X,, 
and X,,, while the means for groups 1 and 3 tend 
to be similar (and lower) on the remaining vari- 
ables. In no instance, however, are the means for 
group 3 significantly higher than the means for 
group 2 on any of the resource allocation pro- 
cess variables and they clearly tend to be lower. 
Thus, the arguments from the professional litera- 
ture are not supported for upper management 
on either the goal setting or resource allocation 
aspects of ZBB. 
The above interpretation is formulated on the 
univariate ANOVA results and does not consider 
the interaction effects among the ten ZBB vari- 
ables. Again though, a discriminant analysis can 
provide a description of how the three groups 
differ inclusive of interaction effects. In order to 
permit additional insight into this question, a 
plot of the standardized coefficient centroids in 
reduced space formed by the two discriminant 
functions is shown in Table 4 along with the 
more relevant discriminant coeffkients from 
Table 3. The standardized coefficients of effec- 
tiveness ( Y2) and understanding expected end- 
results of the goal-setting process (X,) are nega- 
tive, while the systemic variable of achieving 
’ ’ Because it was necessary to average the effectiveness variables X,. X,,,. X,,. and XL, for groups I and 2 for reasons of com- 
parabilitv with group 3. I’? is treated as a macro variable in the analysis of the total management hierarchy. 
” The univariate and multivariate non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests were repeated for the ten variables listed in Table 3 
and yielded essentially the same significance levels as those of the parametric tests. 
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TABLE 3. Results for total management hierarchy 
Dependent 
variables 
Group 1 
MB0 
users 
Means(X) MANOVA 
ANOVA Standardized canonical coeffkients 
Group 2 Group 3 
Non-MB0 upper 
users management F-value p< Function 1 Function 2 
Goal 
setting 
Y 
X, 
Decision 
package 
formulation 
XI, 
XI, 
XI, 
Ranking 
X10 
Systems 
perspective 
ofZBB 
process 
XZ1 
X,, 
XL1 
tv2 
Discriminant fun tion 
3.35 3.28 3.16 0.2269 0.80 0.0929 0.1’55 
3.17 3.31 3.16 0.4025 0.67 -O.-i519 -0.5658 
3.12 3.27 3.28 0.7954 0.45 0.2908 -0.4870 
3.02 3.37 3.4 1 2.207 0.11 0.3252 -0.1’37 
3.03 3.49 3.13 4.078 0.02 0.1734 0.37’0 
3.18 3.31 3.06 0.8234 0.44 -0.0818 -0.1142 
3.14 3.51 3.03 3.536 0.03 -0.2193 0.3772 
3.22 3.66 3.50 3.477 0.03 0.3256 -0.0564 
2.74 3.53 3.38 10.23 0.00 0.8064 0.3999 
2.72 2.90 2.16 7.519 0.00 -0.9373 0.6718 
x1 = 61.140 XL = 18.388 
(0.0000) (0.0309) 
* Y, represents the average of variables X, and X, for Groups 1 and 2. 
t Yz represents the average of variables X,, X,,,, X,, and X,, for Groups 1 and 2. 
objectives (X,,) is positive for discriminant 
function 1. Interestingly, discriminant function 
2 indicates a positive standardized coefficient 
for effectiveness ( Yz) while that of understand- 
ing expected end-results of the goal-setting pro- 
cess (X,) remains negative. The other relevant 
standardized coefficient from discriminant func- 
tion 2 of understanding the net benefits from 
incremental analysis (X,,) is also negative. 
An interesting pattern emerges from the two 
discriminant functions plotted in Table 4. Func- 
tion 1, which captures 71.78% of the variance, 
indicates that group 1 tends to score relatively 
higher on the goal-setting variable X, and the 
resource allocation variable Yr, but relatively 
lower on the resource allocation variable X,, in 
comparison to group 2 which has the opposite 
tendency. However, because the centroid of 
group 3 falls in the lower right-hand quadrant, 
there is a tendency for group 3 to behave similar 
to group 2 on these variables. On the other hand, 
function 2, which captures 28.28% of the var- 
iance, indicates that group 2 tends to score rela- 
tively higher on the resource allocation process 
variable Y, and relatively lower on the goal-set- 
ting variable X, and the resource allocation vari- 
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TABLE 4. Plot of standardized coeflkicnt ccntroids 
Function 2 
(+) (Yz) 
Group 2 
. 
(-) (+) 
Function 11 I 
(X2) (X2,) 
(Yr) . 
Group 1 
. 
Group 3 
- 
(-) 
(X1) 
(X,,) 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Function 1 Function 2 
-0.659 -0.219 
0.153 0.444 
0.89 1 -0.429 
able X, 2 in comparison to both groups 1 and 3. It 
should be specifkally noted that, although all 
three groups are equally discriminated by the 
discriminant function analysis (since an approx- 
imately equilateral triangle was generated in the 
discriminant space), the variances accounted for 
by each function (significant by their corres- 
ponding eigenvalues) were considerably diffe- 
rent: function 1 accounts for approximately 2.5 
times more variance than function 2 in the actual 
subjects X group variation. The clear positive 
loadings on function 2 for group 2 and the nega- 
tive loadings on both functions 1 and 2 for group 
1. in conjunction with the above discussion of 
Table 4, thus indicates that group 3 is not 
uniquely different from the other two groups. 
Considering these results together with the con- 
sistently higher mean scores for group 2 over all 
variables compared to the other groups (see 
Table 3) serves to strengthen the conclusion 
that research hypotheses H, and Ii, cannot be 
accepted with respect to the upper management 
group. 
There may be concern, however, that the 
smaller number of observations for group 3 
reduced the power of the multivariate test. 
Table 5 suggests that this is not the case. The pre- 
dictive accuracy for group 3 ranked highest 
(71.9% ). group 2 ranked next (57.6% ), and 
group 1 ranked lowest ( 52.6% ). The total sam- 
ple correctly classified is 58.78% with p < 
0.001. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The evidence uncovered in this study raises 
several questions about the design process of 
budgeting systems and the credibility of imple- 
menting ZBB with an existing MB0 system. On 
the one hand, it would appear that design 
strategies which concentrate only on the system 
to be implemented fail to recognize important 
anchoring conditions and stabilized learning 
behaviors (Hedberg & Jonsson, 1978; Staw et al., 
1981) which thwart integration efforts and the 
subsequent validity of the new information sys- 
tems. While the results obtained here do not 
contradict generalized strategies normally 
employed with ZBB implementation, neither do 
they suggest that such strategies, taken alone, are 
sufficient. Even more important though, is that 
the results underscore the need to pursue Hop- 
wood’s (1978) and Boland’s (1979) call for 
increased research toward understanding the 
systemic properties and qualities of different 
budgeting and management information sys- 
tems. 
Perhaps the most intriguing finding in the 
present study is the magnitude and directional 
differences discovered in comparison to the 
research hypotheses. Not only could the latter 
not be accepted, but both the univariate and 
multivariate analysis manifested significant dif- 
ferences in the opposite direction for a number 
of variables. Thus the prescriptions in the profes- 
sional literature, which anticipate that ZBB 
implementation will be facilitated by the prior 
existence of MBO, not only appear to be mis- 
guided, but in fact, apparently overlook signific- 
ant factors which tend to inhibit such implemen- 
tation. While we have previously noted some 
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TABLE 5. ZBB perceptions as indications of group status 
Group 1 
Predicted group 
Group 2 Group 3 
Actual 
group 
MB0 users 
(Group I ) 
Non-MB0 users 
(Group 2) 
Upper manage- 
ment (Group 3) 
30 10 
(52.6% ) (29:6) (17.5% ) 57’ 
13 34 12 
(22.0% ) (57.6% ) (203%) 59’ 
(9.43% ) 
6 23 
(18.8%) (71.9%) 32 
Combined percent correctly classified: 58.78% (p < 0.00 1). 
* Five cases could not be discriminated from lower management sample. 
potential counter-arguments to those in the pro- 
fessional literature, they do not appear to exp- 
lain sufficiently the findings over the total man- 
agement hierarchy for the goal-setting and 
resource allocation variables considered in con- 
cert. More appropriate in this context is an 
interpretation reflective of symbolic or ritualis- 
tic behavior (Dirsmith & Jablonksy, 1979b; 
Dirsmith ef al., 1980; Jonsson, 1982). It is con- 
ceivable that top management, although com- 
mitted in principle to the voluntary MB0 prog- 
ram, was genuinely disappointed with its inabil- 
ity to cope with dramatically increasing costs. 
ZBB implementation was seen as an incremental 
action program consistent with existing organi- 
zational myths and values, and therefore, as pre- 
serving a sense of organizational stability. Upper 
management thus built upon the MB0 goal 
structures and simply shifted their MB0 experi- 
ence to the ZBB resource allocation process. 
Effective control over discretionary spending 
in a ZBB system though, is constrained by uncer- 
tain cause/effect relationships and ambiguous 
output standards (Williams, 198 1). It is likely in 
the present case that the MB0 goal structures 
could not be nicely decomposed so as to match 
the decentralized strategy formulation process 
which precedes the formation of operational 
goals in the ZBB process. Attempts to enhance 
control under these conditions are supported by 
ritual and not by rational analysis (Ouchi, 1977). 
This may explain why upper management per- 
ceived more benefit from the goal-setting pro- 
cess than predicted by research hypothesis H, 
and simultaneously yielded responses aligned 
more closely to lower level MB0 users on 
resource variables X, 5, X,, and X7a, as evidenced 
in Tables 3 and 4. Thus, MB0 experience was a 
poor teacher and could not crystallize otherwise 
ambiguous links between uncertain cause/effect 
knowledge and desired outcomes. This explana- 
tion is reinforced by upper management’s low 
perceived benefit of the over-all effectiveness 
(variable Yz) of ZBB implementation. 
A commitment to demonstrating rationality, 
even if symbolic, does not fully explain the 
above results nor the importance of function 2 
in Tables 3 and 4. That is, why are the resource 
allocation variables X, 2r X, + X,3 and X2+ aligned 
between upper management and lower level 
non-MB0 users? Furthermore, why did each of 
these two groups indicate higher perceived 
benefits than lower level MB0 users on this sub- 
set of variables? Each of these co-alignment pat- 
terns may be sensible in the context of viewing 
MB0 as a stabilizing system and ZBB as a 
destabilizing system (Williams, 1981). Smooth 
integration of ZBB with MB0 might not even be 
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anticipated. since managers familiar with a 
stabilizing system may be confused or 
threatened by efforts to implement a destabiliz- 
ing system. In this case, it could be argued that 
MB0 was an important part of the organization’s 
power structure, since it enabled lower level 
managers to have a voice in determining their 
objectives and spending programs. MB0 was 
thus a stabilizing element. ZBB implementation, 
on the other hand, provided the organization 
with a legitimate system for concentrating it&t- 
ence and control at higher levels in the hierar- 
chy. Although it constricted control, ZBB 
implementation was destabilizing because it cal- 
led into question the status quo arrangements of 
MBO. This implementation action would have 
been seen as threatening to lower level MB0 
users who had become accustomed to the 
autonomy which MB0 conferred. 
Systems designers, therefore, must be cogniz- 
ant of the potential mismatch of system charac- 
teristics when dual systems are placed in joint 
use. Expectations of systems compatibility pre- 
dicted by conventional rationality may be 
unfounded when viewed from a stabilizing 
destabilizing perspective (Williams, 1983). The 
results in this study, for upper management in 
particular, indicate that this factor may have 
been operative. Also, a focus on a stabilizing 
destabilizing theme by accounting researchers 
could enhance our systems understanding of 
maladaptive or pathological cycles of behavior 
(Merton, 1967; Hall, 1976) and corresponding 
threat-rigidity effects (Staw et al., 1981) on 
important implementation issues. More 
research in the area certainly appears to be war- 
ranted. 
The practical significance of this study must 
be approached with some caution. Potentially 
serious errors in judgment could arise if upper 
management is unable to correctly rationalize 
the mismatch between a priori implementation 
expectations and de facto implementation 
experience. The ZBB process might be aban- 
doned completely. or severely limited in scope 
during subsequent budgeting cycles, precisely 
when organizational effectiveness and/or survi- 
val demand more ZBB and less MBO. In fact, it 
may well be prudent to have MB0 dismantled 
entirely before ZBB is introduced to the organi- 
zation. This prescription is in addition to general 
“last-day-of-use” ideas (Hedberg et al., 1976), 
which could apply to both MB0 and ZBB, and is 
specific to the situation where ZBB is needed 
and MB0 already exists. These are matters 
which additional research on the coupling of 
ZBB with MB0 must address. 
LIMITATIONS 
The extent to which the results of this study 
can be generalized to ZBB integration with MB0 
in other private sector organizations is, of 
course, limited by the usual caveats that apply to 
a field study involving only a single organization. 
Although management demographic data and 
departmental context did not present any obvi- 
ous bias, several aspects of the study were poten- 
tially troublesome. 
The selection of variables yielded a rather 
lengthy list which suggests that the question- 
naire could be simplified. However, ZBB is a 
very complex budgeting process (Hofstede, 
1981) and there was no simple mechanism for 
isolating key variables. In particular, the decision 
was made to include the set of micro resource 
allocation variables since each one of them is 
accorded importance in the standard technol- 
ogy underlying a complete ZBB implementa- 
tion, and hence, they may have provided a more 
profound insight than consideration of only the 
macro or systemic aspect of the ZBB resource 
allocation process. Also, the large set of depen- 
dent variables raises questions of understanda- 
bility and possible ambiguity which could have 
confounded management perceptions and their 
responses. Each variable was, however, deliber- 
ated upon in the ZBB training sessions which 
were attended by all participants in the ZBB 
implementation process. Moreover, all particip- 
ants were engaged in the same training program 
and standardized procedures and formats were 
common across departments. 
This leads to a second issue of concern. 
namely, the utilization of two asymmetrical (at 
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least in form) questionnaires. Several factors 
were instrumental in this decision. First, the 
nature and complexity of ZBB implementation is 
systematically different for various hierarchical 
levels in an organization generally; functional 
tasks are not uniform, management orientation 
and committment to the organization may be 
different, and management responsibilities are 
not homogeneous, as one traverses from lower 
to higher echelons. This is most evident in the 
funding decision, which emanates from top man- 
agement and not lower levels in the hierarchy. 
Thus, it was imperative to try to capture this 
aspect together with the differential in manage- 
ment functions. The omission of the learning 
variables from the upper management question- 
naire also reflects these differences. For exam- 
ple, preliminary research, pilot testing ZBB, and 
the design of communication documents were 
confined to the efforts of upper management and 
the time involvement could not be objectively 
differentiated as it was for lower management. 
In an effort to minimize any bias in respon- 
dent’s perceptions, strict control was applied to 
the timing and exposure of each set of question- 
naires. Lower level managers were not aware of 
the funding decision, while simultaneously, 
upper management was not cognizant of the 
responses pertaining to the former group. 
A third issue relates, not to the MB0 program 
per se, but to it’s voluntary nature. The program 
clearly permitted free choice among managers, 
and thus, management resistance (Nystrom, 
1977) is not an issue either way. Since the ZBB 
program was mandated across all management 
levels regardless of MB0 user status, it is difftcult 
to accept that the vofuntuty nature of the MB0 
program, in itself, created any attitudinal bias in 
the data base. 
Finally, only a single post-test design was 
employed, again, due to the uniqueness of the 
ZBB implementation process. Certainly over 
time, learning, unlearning, and relearning 
behaviors become dominant dynamic factors 
which impact the longer term effectiveness of 
coupling ZBB with MBO. Then, too, the ex ante 
aspects of ZBB become enmeshed with the e,r 
post control aspects together with everything 
which this implies from a research design 
perspective. These issues are not the focal point 
of the present study but they do provide rich 
opportunities for future inquiry. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of this study are in disharmony 
with prescriptions in the professional literature 
which view an established MB0 system as a pre- 
condition to the smooth and easy implementa- 
tion of ZBB. These prescriptions attend to the 
conjunction of an existing MB0 system, with the 
normal ZBB implementation steps, as a process 
of stabilizing change, grounded in the rational 
behavior of ordinary adaptation. Ignored in this 
conventional wisdom is the possibility that the 
complementarity of ZBB and MB0 is a double- 
edged mechanism. Elements of symbolic ration- 
ality, ritualistic control, and the restructuring of 
information flows with requisite authority, 
create unanticipated destabilizing effects. 
Moreover, as the evidence in this study 
demonstrates, these effects may not be isomor- 
phic across different hierarchical levels in the 
organization. 
In short, organization and individual goals can 
change in the course of introducing deliberate 
innovations (such as the coupling of ZBB with 
MBO) and “As a result, actions affect the prefer- 
ences in the name of which they are taken .” 
(March, 1981, p.570). Finally, the results suggest 
that future research on the linkages of ZBB with 
MB0 (and systems implementation compatibil- 
ity in general) should focus on the anomalous 
dynamics of the existing system and the new 
coupled system. 
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